We introduce an order driver market model with heterogeneous traders that imitate each other on a dynamic network structure. The communication structure is endogenous and evolves using a fitness mechanism based on agents wealth. We assess how imitations among otherway noise traders, can give rise to herd behaviour and how this behaviour affects asset prices. We show how price paths are strongly biased in the direction of the herd. Using a fitness mechanism then we study under which conditions a guru may rise and fall over time and his ability to manipulate the market. So purchases by guru may trigger sufficient purchases by imitators to allow the guru to make profit. In this setting we study the wealth distribution of guru, imitators and no-imitators.
Introduction
Mainstream economics is not able to give a clear explanation for financial market frenzies, crashes and panics. The standard reason, dating back to Friedman (1953) , is that these phenomena driven by the impact of irrational traders on prices is irrelevant since such destabilizing speculators would quickly go bankrupt and be eliminated from the market. So according to mainstream, the study of rational speculators is enough to describe stock markets. In these models prices are typically assumed to be informationally efficient, so that the current price reflects all public information. However there is a considerable evidence that many investors do not act rationally and not follow economists' advice, driving the prices far away their fundamental level. Black (1986) believes that such traders, without access to inside information, irrationally act on noise as if it were information that would give them an edge. Black (1986) , following Kyle (1985) , calls such investors "noise traders". The presence of noise traders and their action on prices' movement is well documented. Some authors show that if 'rational agents' are risk adverse, then their power to take positions against noise traders is limited (Figlewski (1979) , Shiller (1984) , Campbell and Kyle (1987) 
, De Long et al. (1990a)).
But there is an other important source that may explain the impact of noise traders on the prices movement. This interpretation is based on the idea of expectation. In the economic systems individual expectations or beliefs can affect the aggregate outcome. Expectations drive individual behaviours and individual behaviours determine the economic outcome, i.e., prices and trading. "Therefore, a market, like other social environments, may be viewed as an expectations feedback system" (Heemeijer et al. (2009) ). An economic interpretation of expectations feedback system with 'zero intelligence agents' 1 would run as follows. If noise traders today wake up with a pessimistic expectation about an asset, they will sell it frantically, driving down its price. A trader buying this asset must update his expectations recognizing that in the near future noise traders might become even more pessimistic and drive price down more and more. So it is not clear that such trader will now buy. Conversely, if our trader is selling an asset when noise traders have an optimistic expectation about it which drives its price up, he must consider that noise traders might drive prices up even more tomorrow and so it could be not convenient for him to sell now. Because of the unpredictability of noise traders, prices can fluctuate significantly even when fundamental price is sta-1 Our market is populated by agents with naive trading strategies, called noise traders. In this way we are close to the tradition of Zero-Intelligence (ZI) traders as in (Becker (1962) , Gode et al. (1993) , Gode et al. (1997) .
ble. This argument has been generally accepted in the economic works on noise traders and it is based on the prevalence of "positive feedback" traders in financial markets. We can say that there is positive feedback in a stock market if many agents expect the price of an asset to rise and therefore start buying the stock. In this circumstance the aggregate demand will rise and so the asset price. Sutan and Willinger (2005) and Adam (2007) ). All these works have showed that positive feedback traders, if sufficiently aggressive, can destabilize prices. So a coordination of traders' expectations increases the impact of these agents upon the realized prices and convergency to the rational equilibrium price becomes unlikely. An important question is why traders' expectations are often coordinated. Claude Trichet (2001) remarked: "Some operators have come to the conclusion that it is better to be wrong along with everybody else, rather than take the risk of being right or wrong alone"
2 . This "mass-uniform" behaviour was already present in Kaynes (1936) who called it "animal spirits". Conventionally so called 'herd behaviour' occurs in situations with information externalities, when agents' private information is swamped by the information derived from observing others' actions. Some insights into fluctuations in prices and herding effects have been provided by agent-based models. effects among otherway noise traders that imitate some winner agents may be responsible for these fluctuations. Agents in our model imitate the expectations of a winner trader called the Guru and not his actions 3 . The main idea is to reproduce the expectations positive feedback and to confirm its impact on generating herd behaviour and on creating price fluctuations. The mechanism of price formation we introduce here is an order-driven market, as in Chiarella et al. (2009) . There is a book of orders that each trader can check at any time. Within his budget constraints, an agent can place market orders or limit orders for arbitrary quantities. A market order is filled completely if it finds enough capacity on the book, or partially otherwise. A limit order is stored in the book and executed (partially or completely) when it finds a match during the rest of the trading session. If a market order or a limit order are not filled completely, the agent is rationed. We have decided to use an order-driven market to avoid the limitations of the approach of market maker. If in the market there is a market maker there is no explicit mechanism of trading. The market maker is risk neutral and endowed with unbounded liquidity, which is used to absorb excess demand and make trading always viable, regardless of its size. In each period, the market maker adjusts the price to reduce the excess demand. Inspired by the metaphor of the Walrasian tâtonnement, this price-adjusting rule fails to recognize that in a real market trade occurs whenever two agents can match their requests at a given price. In an order driven market, where agents imitate the expectations of others and not their action, it is not obvious that imitation leads to larger coordination and in turn to larger fluctuation. In fact if the guru expects a price increase, he himself and/or the agents that imitate his expectation may submit limit orders instead of market orders, and the immediate impact of their trades may be negligible. What we want to study in this paper is precisely if and how the natural intuition that imitiation leads to larger price fluctuation is satisfied also in limit order markets. As pointed out by the model of Tedeschi et al. (2009) of which this is an extension, communication and imitation of a given agent, named the guru, if dynamically evolving, can induce not only volatility clustering but multiscaling as well. The originality of this work as regards our previous version (2009) is the communication network. We introduce here an endogenous mechanism of interactions, by implementing a preferential attachment rule (Barabási and Albert (1999) ) such that each trader is imitated by others with a probability proportional to its profit. Two models that are related to our are that of Markose et al. (2004) and LeBaron et al (2009) . Markose et al. (2004) develop a model where agents make a binary decision, to buy or sell a single unit of an asset, following the advice of the other agents they are connected to. The interaction network evolves dynamically as agents adaptively modify the weights of their links to their neighbours by reinforcing "good" advisors and breaking away from "bad" advisors. The question Markose et al. try to answer to is whether and when the dynamic process of reinforced learning can lead to the creation of small world networks. That model nonetheless is not directed at understand the impact of herding on the large price fluctuations of the stock market (the process of trading is not explicitly modeled), but to study the evolution of the underlying network topology itself. We follow Markose as far as it is concerned the effects of Guru in the network, but we focus our analysis on the stock market adding a realistic mechanism of prices formation. LeBaron et al. (2009) , instead, develop a dynamic model able to reproduce long memory persistence in many financial time series, i.e, trading volume, price volatility and signed order flow. Traders in this model make weighted forecasts on assets future return combining a fundamental, chartist and noise inducted components. After few trading rounds go by agents look at their past performances in term of expected prices and realized prices and they update their fundamental, chartist and noise inducted components using a genetic algorithm selecting those parameters which have performed better. The authors prove that this co-ordination of tradersÕ strategies, when it can generate imitative behaviour, is critical in generating long memory. The originality of our work as regards LeBaron et al. (2009) is in the communication structure. In our model imitation arises via a fitness mechanism based on agents wealth and there is no switching behaviours among different strategies as in LeBaron et al. (2009) . Although our traders are noise traders, they endogenously evolve subdividing themselves in three categories: leaders (Gurus), followers (imitators) and noise traders. These roles mirror agents' performances during the trading session. In particular we implement an algorithm where agents link to the most successful agent in term of profit and imitate his expectation. Using this mechanism of links formation allows us also to study under which conditions a guru may endogenously rise and fall over time, and how imitation affects the distribution of agents wealth.
Although we assume agents initially start with the same amount of stock and cash, we observe, when imitation increases, a fat tail distribution on the individuals' wealth and on the stocks' size, in accordance with the empirical evidence that market participants are very heterogeneous in size (see, for example, Pareto (1897), Zipf (1949) , Ijiri and Simon (1977) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model; in section 3 we present the results of the simulations; section 4 concludes.
The model 2.1 The market
This section describes our market which is based on the order-driven market used in Chiarella et al. (2009) . A population of N traders can either place market orders, which are immediately executed at the current best listed price, or they can place limit orders. Limit orders are stored in the exchange's book and executed using time priority at a given price and price priority across prices. A transaction occurs when a market order hits a quote on the opposite side of the market.
Trading happens over a number of periods t k , with k = 1, · · · T . At the beginning of each period, traders make expectations about the price at the end of a given time horizon τ (that we take to be the same for all traders).
The future price expected at time t k + τ by agent i is given bŷ
wherer i t k ,t k +τ is the agent's expectation on the spot return which, as we will see later, may be affected by the expectation of other agents and p t k is the reference price observed by all agents at the beginning of each period.
After expectations are made, N t trades are submitted each period. Agents enter the market, sequentially and in a random order and they have to decide whether to place a buy or a sell order and choose the size of the order. Agents are risk averse and maximize an exponential CARA utility function
where the coefficient α i measures the risk aversion of trader i. We assume that agents' risk aversion depends crucially on the expectation formation mechanism described below. Particularly we assume that those agents with higher credibility and so very imitated, as gurus are, are less risk averse than agents with no impact on other agents' expectations. This assumption is quite credible. Since the impact of gurus' expectation, as we will show, is determinant for addressing the prices movement, it is quite obvious they give less weigh to the risk. This effect is captured by setting
where α is some reference level of risk aversion, l
is the percentage of existing links that point to agent i at time t k and w measures the impact that agent j's expectation has on the agent i's expectation: smaller is w, higher is this impact. We next define the portfolio wealth of each agent as
where S i t ≥ 0 and C i t ≥ 0 are respectively the stock and cash position of agent i at time t. The optimal composition of the agent's portfolio is determined in the usual way by trading-off expected return against expected risk. However the agents are not allowed to engage in short-selling. When agents place a market order, their cash and stocks positions are updated accordingly. When agents place a limit order, the cash they commit to buy and the stocks they commit to sell are also tentatively removed from their portfolios (even if a limit order does not comport an immediate transaction). In this way agents can not spend money or sell stocks that have already committed in the book. If the order is cancelled, the stocks and cash that were tied down in the orders are returned to the traders who had submitted them. The number of stocks an agent is willing to hold in its portfolio at a given price level p depends on the choice of the utility function. For the CARA utility function assumed here the optimal composition of the portfolio, that is the number of stocks the agent wishes to hold is given by
where V i t is the variance of returns expected by agent i, α i is the level of risk aversion of i and τ is a given time horizon 5 . If the amount π i (p) is larger (smaller) than the number of stocks already in the portfolio of agent i then the agent decides to buy (sell). We estimate V i t as the variance of past returns, estimated by each agent as
where the average spot returnr i t is given bȳ
where r t and p t = p t−1 exp(r t ) are, respectively, the spot return and the spot price at time t. In order to determine the buy/sell price range of a typical agent, we first estimate numerically the price level p * at which agents are satisfied with the composition of their current portfolio, which is determined by
Eq. (8) admits a unique solution with 0 < p * ≤p i t+τ since S i t ≥ 0 given that short selling is not allowed. Agents are willing to buy at any price p < p * since in this price range their demand is greater than their holding. While agents are willing to sell at any price p > p * since then their demand is less than their holding. Note that agents may thus wish to sell even if they expect a future price increase. If we select p = p * agents decide to do nothing. As we want to impose budget constraints we need to restrict ourselves to values of p ≤p i t+τ = p M to ensure π(p) ≥ 0 and so rule out short selling. Furthermore to ensure that an agent has sufficient cash to purchase the desired Position Type of order Volume p m < p < a q t
BUY
Limit order stocks, the smallest value of p = p m we can allow for agent i is determined by its cash position (see Eq. (4)), and so is given by the condition
Again one can easily show that this equation also admits a unique solution with 0 < p m ≤p (8) and (9) it can be easily proven that 0 < p m ≤ p * ≤p i t+τ . Having determined that the possible values at which an agent can satisfactorily trade are in the interval [p m , p M ], we next consider how the nature of the agent's order is determined. Suppose now that the agent chooses to trade at a price p < p * , then it submits a limit order to buy an amount
while if p > p * it submits a limit order to sell an amount
However if p < p * and p > a q t the buy order can be executed immediately at the ask. An agent in this case would submit a market order to buy an amount
Similarly if p > p * and p < b q t the agent would submit a market order to sell an amount
. If the depth at the bid (ask) is not enough to fully satisfy the order, the remaining volume is executed against limit orders in the book. The agent thus takes the next best buy (sell) order and repeats this operation as many times as necessary until the order is fully executed. This mechanism applies under the condition that quotes of these orders are above (below) price p. Otherwise, the remaining volume is converted into a limit order at price p. If the limit order is still unmatched at time t + τ it is removed from the book.
The essential details of the trading mechanism are summarized in Table 1 , showing how it depends on the price level p, the "satisfaction level" p * , the best ask a q t and the best bid b q t .
The network
To model how agents' decision are influenced by their mutual interaction we introduce a communication structure in which nodes represents agents and the hedges are the connective links between them. Links are directional and go from the agent that requests advice to the agent that provides advice.
In general local interaction models agent interacts directly with a finite number of others in the population. The set of nodes with whom a node is linked is referred to as its neighbourhoods. In our model the number of out-going links is constrained to be one. The reason being that in a highly connected random network synchronisation could be achieved via indirect links. The effects of direct imitation are easier to be tested in a diluted network where indirect synchronisation is less likely to arise. We consider an endogenous mechanism of preferential attachment based on a fitness parameter given by agent's wealth. Agents start with the same amount of cash C t=0 and stocks St = 0, so that all agents have the same initial wealth W t=0 = C t=0 + p t=0 S t=0 . As time goes by, some traders may become richer than others. As a measure of agents' success we define their fitness at time t as their wealth relative to the wealth W max of the richest agent i max :
Each agent i starts with one outgoing link with random agent j, and possibly some incoming links with other agents. Links are rewinded at the beginning of each period, in the following way: each agent i cuts its outgoing link, with agent k, and forms a new link, with a randomly chosen agent j, with a probability
The rewind algorithm is designed so that successful traders gain a higher number of incoming links and thus have a higher probability of being imi-tated. Nonetheless the algorithm introduces a certain amount of randomness, and links with more successful agent have a finite probability to be cut in favour of links with less successful agents. In this way we model imperfect information and bounded rationality of agents. The randomness also helps unlocking the system from the situation where all agents link to the same guru.
The expectation formation mechanism
At the beginning of each trading period t k , agents make idiosyncratic expectations about the spot return,r i t k ,t k +τ in the interval (t k , t k + τ ). We assume that agents are not informed and have random expectation of future returns. We also assume that agents are heterogeneous in that they have different forecasts of the returns' volatility, σ i t . Expected returns are thus given bŷ
where σ i t k is a positive, agent specific, constant and t ∼ N (0, 1) is a normal noise.
After individual expectation are generated, a consultation round starts during which agents sequentially, and in a random order, revise their expectation. The revised expected return is obtained by weighing agent i's own expectation with that of agent j to which i is linked to
When w is equal to zero, i trusts completely the opinions of j, while when w is equal to one i considers exclusively his own opinion and agents decisions are fully independent from each other. At the beginning of each period t k agents expectations are reset to random values. We stress that in the model imitation is purely expectation based, and agents do not imitate the actions of others. This choice is motivated by the fact that in a real market normally the order book is not fully visible to traders, and the order submission is anonymous.
While agents are noise traders in our model, we assume that they correctly anticipate the impact of herding on asset prices. In particular if an agent has several incoming links, and w is small (in which case the agent expects to be able to influence the decisions of others), he forecast a larger price volatility. This is incorporated in the model by assuming that the volatility of returns is proportional to the number of incoming links and to the weights w, such that σ
where l % i,t k in the percentage of existing links that point to agent i at time t k and A is a constant parameter. The values of σ i 0 are chosen, with uniform probability, in the interval (0, σ 0 ).
Simulations and results
The model is studied numerically for different values of the parameter w. In the first part we focus the analysis on some properties of the network like "guru" effects, herding, in-degree and fitness distribution. Then we analyze the fluctuations in realized prices, the positive feedback and the statistical properties of the probability distribution of wealth and stock. In the simulations the number of traders is set at N = 150. Each agent is initially given the same amount of stock S 0 = 100 and cash C 0 = 100. The initial stock price is chosen at p 0 = 1000. We also fix τ = 200, α = 0.01, and β i uniformly distributed in the interval [5, 45] The results reported here are the outcome of simulations of T = 1000 periods and N t = 300 trades per periods. Simulations are repeated M = 100 times with a different random seed.
The network
In this section we show that the profit is a good mechanism of fitness, that should be capable of creating a meaningful and interesting dynamics of interactions. In figure (1) we plot the index of current guru(black), the percentage of incoming link to current guru (red) and fitness of current guru(green) for different w as function of the time. The figure shows that a number of agents alternate as the guru during the simulation (black line). The stability (or long life) of guru is strictly correlated to the imitation: higher imitation (smaller w) longer the guru's life. The guru acquires an increasing number of links up to at most 80% of all possible links (red line), but as more agents imitate the guru, some of them can become richer than the guru as signalled by the fact that the fitness (green line) of the guru becomes smaller than 1. Figure. (2) displays the agents' fitness parameter at the end of simulation for the same value of w. The plots show that as we decrease w the values of the fitness parameters variate more across agents. While in the case of no imitation (w = 1) (right side) agents end up with similar fitnesses (and thus similar wealth), when imitation increases (w = 0.1) the guru (here agent number 108) becomes richer then the rest of the system. Nonetheless decreasing w the guru, while still one of the richest, is outperformed by other agents (as the agent 145 for w = 0.1 on the left side) that become even richer than the guru. The rewinding algorithm induces a switching to a new richest agent that becomes the guru in turn. The explanation of the above results resides in the dynamics of the σ i t (Eq. 12). In a limit order market price changes are mainly driven by market orders 6 . The larger is σ i t the larger is the price variability expected by agent i, and consequently the absolute value of his expected future price. By increasing σ i t with the number of incoming links, more popular agents become more 6 As it is well documented (Lillo and Farmer (2004) , Eisler et al. (2009) ) the impact of limit orders, specially in case of synchronization and imitation, should reduce price fluctuations and not amplify them. In fact the mechanism describing the impact of limit orders on prices would run as follows. A market order on one side of the book attract compensating limit orders, so when there are more market orders in one side of the book, one expects more limit orders and cancellations on the same side as well. Intuitively, if the guru splits his order and buys or sells using market orders for a long period of time, this will attract, thank to the imitation effect, compensating limit orders on the same side of the book and their effect should re-equilibrate prices and not to generate large price fluctuations. So the impact of a buy trade following other buy traders should be smaller than the impact of a sell trade following buy traders. Eisler et al. (2009) show that events happening on the same side of the book are long-range correlated, but the signed correlation function (that assigns an opposite sign to limit and market orders on the same side of the book) is short ranged, showing that the compensating effect alluded to above is indeed effective. optimistic (pessimistic) and more likely to submit market orders instead of limit orders (because of equations 1, 4, 7) . If the agents has enough connections he can influence several others to also submit market orders in the same direction. A series of market orders in turn can generate a considerable price change in the direction predicted by he guru. To assess the reciprocal influences among traders and the coordinations of their actions we implement the herding coefficient used by Markose et al. (2004) . Since herding is the consequence of mimetic responses by agents interacting on a communication network, we measure, for each t k , the number of traders N b,t k taking the same decision to buy. So the herding phenomena can be captured at each t k by a simple time varying herding function ] , where N b,t k is the number of agents who have bought at time t k and N t = 300 is the number of trades per periods. When this function is close to a half, the market show no herding. When H t k is close to zero, the market is herding in the direction of selling and vice versa when H t k =1. fact the movement of the Herding coefficient is significantly different from a half (red line). Whereas, when the imitation of expectations decreases the herding coefficient is close to a half, reflecting no coordination in the agents' action. As we have pointed above, our traders imitate expectations, no actions. Therefore, the Herding coefficient, analyzing the coordination among actions, allows us to state that, in our model, expectations drive individual actions and they determine the economic outcome, i.e., trading. We can conclude that this model reproduces an expectations feedback system. Finally, figure. (5) displays one shot of the configuration of the endogenous network for w = 0.1, w = 0.5 and w = 1.0. The graphs show that few gurus could also co-exist and compete among themselves for popularity, as agents 108 (guru) and 145 (the richest) in the left side. So the endogenous attachment mechanism allows a guru to emerge spontaneously in the system, rise and fall in popularity over time, and possibly be replaced by a new guru. Moreover the configuration of the networks show that our model is able to generate a graph topology very different from the random graph studied extensively by Erdos and Renyi (1960) . In a random graph all agents on average have the same number of links to them and from them 7 . In our context, the in-degree of an agent would be the number of other agents connected to him. That is, the number of agents that are taking advice from him and the measure of influence of the agent. While in an Erdos-Reny random graph the in-degree has a Binomial (or Poisson) distribution, in the real world networks the in-degree has a very different distribution. In particular, some agents are found to have a disproportionately large number of incoming links while the others have very few. This is more keeping with the degree distribution of scale-free networks whereby the distribution has a 'fat tail'. So the figure. The distribution of the in-degree shows that our model is able to create a small number of highly connected agents, called 'gurus'. Moreover these few agents have a higher fitness as showed by the fitness distribution. This result allows us to conclude that the profit is a good mechanism of links formation able to generate the famous Matthew effect 8 .
Prices Analysis and 'positive feedback'
In this section we analyze the impact of herding on the realized prices and the correlation between expected prices and realized prices. This correlation allow us to show the presence of a positive feedback in the different scenarios of our model. Figure. (7) displays a sample path of the prices time series (red line) and the corresponding percentage of guru's incoming link for w = 0.1, w = 0.5 and w = 1.0. Changing the percentage of incoming links to the guru, the topological structure of the connectivity network generated via the endogenous mechanism allow a much higher level of synchronization among agents. This is revealed by the price trajectory, shown in figure. (7). Prices are characterized by a much wider excursion and occasionally very large jumps when imitation is predominant (w=0.1). Figure. (8) shows prices (black lines) and average expected prices (red lines) for w = 0.1, w = 0.5 and w = 1.0 When in a stock market higher average price forecast produces higher realized market price we say that there is a positive expectations feedback. In case of imitation (see Figure. (8 (left side)) our model shows that price expectations become self-confirming and lead to high realized asset prices. Increasing w we lose this effect. As shown in the same figure (right side), when w = 1, the expected prices (red line) are more volatile then realized prices. In this case we lose the correlation between expected and realized prices and so their large excursions. In presence of positive feedback, when actions are strategic complements (see Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) , Heemeijer et al. (2007) ) traders have an incentive to imitate each other, since predicting a price close to the predictions of other players turns out to be most profitable. Coordination of predictions, that in our model is driven by the fitness mechanism, enhances the impact of noise traders upon the realized prices. This coordination causes oscillatory price movement.
We calculate the mean deviation from expected prices,
, and we average it on the number of simulations. We find that the deviation of the realized prices from the expected ones is minor when imitation is high, confirming the results already shown in the previous graphs. In fact, in case of positive feedback, the market price is close to the average price prediction and the correlation between them is very high. show that, when noise traders follow positive feedback strategies, they buy when prices increase and sell when prices fall. This dynamic is generated in our model by the fitness. When the guru is able to convince, thanks to his high profit, many agents that his expectation is a good one, then the model is able to generate herding behaviour as shown in figure. (4) . This mechanism of coordination induces followers to act as the guru does. If the guru expects the price to increase (decrease) therefore, according to equations 4, starts buying (selling) the asset, his followers, especially in the case of a high imitation, that is small w and high number of guru's in-degree, will buy (sell) as well. The aggregate demand will increase (decrease), and so, by the law of supply and demand, will the asset prices. A natural way to assess the comovement between the increase (decrease) in prices and increase (decrease) in purchase orders is to study the correlation between prices and number of buyers. When this correlation is significantly positive means that the price rise increases the number of buyers, thus confirming the positive feedback. Figure. able to generate a high correlation coefficient when imitation is significant. In particular, for very high levels of imitation the model shows a significant correlation 9 between average price and number of buyers, confirming the presence of a positive feedback. Also, as the plot in the figure indicates, the correlation is an increasing function of w.
Wealth analysis
This last session aims to analyze the wealth of agents and, in particular, the different performances of gurus, imitators and noise traders. Figure. Fig (1) (red line) . Particularly, we observe that the guru becomes the richest when w is small and the number of agents imitating the guru's strategy increases. Moreover, the figure shows that, for small values of w the imitators (red lime) are richer than noise traders (green line). Increasing w, however, imitators and noise traders perform in the same way. These results come from the effect that gurus and followers have on the risk. Even if our agents are risk adverse, gurus and followers on average overestimate returns, according to equation 13 or underestimate risk, according to equation 3. In fact, these traders, when w is small and their percentage of incoming links,l % is high, invest more in the risk asset than no-followers. This is clear by Eq 4 where the number of stocks gurus and imitators wish to hold is higher, since they face a smaller risk aversion σ i . So, investing more gurus and followers may earn higher average profits. Our results follows the trend of studies on noise traders risk with positive feedback in financial markets. Particularly, De Long et al. (1990a) show that noise traders can earn higher returns solely by bearing more of the risk that they themselves create.
To confirm the robustness of these results we display, in graph. (11) , the average wealths over one hundred simulations carried. The figure. (11) the result shown in the previous graph.So we can attest that purchases by a group of 'uninformed traders', as our guru and followers are, may trigger sufficient purchases by positive feedback investors to allow the group to make profit 10 .
The last part of our analysis aims at showing fat tail distributions on the individuals' wealth and on the stocks' size, in accordance with the empirical evidence that market participants are very heterogeneous in size. Figure. (12) shows the decumulative distribution function (DDF) of the wealth (left side) and stock (right side) for the different values of w. Raising imitation the model is able to generate heterogeneity between agents, as confirmed by a fat tail distribution of agents' wealth and stock.
Conclusion
We have shown that the endogenous attachment mechanism introduced in our model allows a guru to emerge spontaneously in the system, rise and fall in popularity over time, and possibly be replaced by a new guru. A few gurus could also co-exist and compete among themselves for popularity. Nonetheless, for the endogenous attachment mechanism to be capable of creating, sustaining and destroying a guru, agents need to benefit from imitating and being imitated. In fact, if an agent profits from being imitated, he becomes richer and imitated even more, until a large fraction of agents points to him. Nonetheless, if only the agents who are imitated benefit from imitation, once an agent becomes a guru he would remain a guru for ever. On the other side, if other agents also profit from imitating the guru, their profit could eventually overcome that of the guru, and they could become guru in turn. Moreover, the fact that our unsophisticated investors, just driven by a trivial herding behaviour, can earn very high profits implies that Friedman's hypothesis is incomplete. In presence of imitative behaviours and positive feedback, to assume that noise traders quickly go bankrupt and are eliminated from the market is unrealistic. In fact we have show that noise traders can cause large price fluctuations and thanks to them earn very high profits. In particular, gurus and followers may trigger sufficient purchases by positive feedback to allow them to make profit. These results should not be underestimated, specially in the context of fluctuations in market prices, where the idea of full rationality is implausible, since prices unlikely incorporate information and expectations of traders.
